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“EXPELLED TO NOWHERE”: SCHOOL 
EXCLUSION LAWS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Melanie Riccobene Jarboe* 
Abstract: Chapter 71, section 37H1/2 of the Massachusetts General Laws 
allows school principals to suspend any student charged with a felony and 
to expel that student if he or she is convicted or found to be delinquent. 
Students expelled from one school in Massachusetts have no right to at-
tend any other school in the state. Therefore, expulsion has the potential 
to bring a student’s educational career to an end. This Note argues that 
chapter 71, section 37H1/2 of the Massachusetts General Laws is unconsti-
tutional under both the Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions because 
it violates students’ right to a “minimally adequate education.” Further, 
this Note argues that the Massachusetts legislature should adopt House 
Bill 178, “An Act Relative to Students’ Access to Educational Services and 
Exclusion from School,” which strikes an appropriate balance between 
school safety and educational opportunity. 
Introduction 
 One spring day in 1996, fourteen-year-old Tom Berrigan was with 
five of his friends in Woburn, Massachusetts when they met up with a 
group of younger boys.1 One of Tom’s friends pulled up his shirt to 
reveal a small souvenir baseball bat that he had tucked into his pants.2 
The gesture convinced the younger boys to give up their chips and soda 
to the older boys.3 Police caught up with Tom and his friends and 
charged all six boys with armed robbery, a felony.4 Massachusetts law 
                                                                                                                      
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Anthony Flint, State’s Tough Expulsion Law Draws Debate: Principals’ Approach Faulted, 
Bos. Globe, Mar. 8, 1997, at A1. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 17 (2008) (defining armed robbery). In Massa-
chusetts, any crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison is a felony. Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 274, § 1 (2008). In addition to more “serious” crimes like armed robbery, felo-
nies include kicking another person with a shod foot and receiving stolen property worth 
more than $250. See ch. 265, § 15B(b) (defining assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon as a felony); Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Mass. 2001) (holding 
that, though not dangerous per se, a sneaker may be a “dangerous weapon” when used to 
stomp or kick); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 60 (2008) (defining receipt of stolen 
property worth more than $250 as a felony). 
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allows principals to indefinitely suspend or expel students who get into 
trouble, even when they are off school grounds.5 Tom’s principal took 
advantage of the law and suspended Tom from school for the final six 
weeks of the school year despite the fact that he had been a bystander.6 
As a result, Tom missed the end of the year in all of his classes and the 
opportunity to try out for the high school football team.7 “Who could 
have known that a moment of bravado and a bag of potato chips would 
cost Tom Berrigan so dearly?”8 
 Every state, including Massachusetts, has zero tolerance policies 
with respect to in-school behavior such as assaulting faculty members or 
bringing drugs or weapons onto school property.9 Massachusetts takes 
this zero tolerance approach one step further by regulating conduct 
that occurs outside of school hours, during school vacations, or off 
school property.10 Chapter 71, section 37H1/2 of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws (“37H1/2” or “section 37H1/2”) allows a principal to suspend a 
student “for a period of time determined appropriate” if (1) the stu-
dent has been charged with a felony and (2) the principal “determines 
that the student’s continued presence in school would have a substan-
tial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the school.”11 If the 
                                                                                                                      
5 Flint, supra note 1; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008). 
6 Flint, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2006); § 37H(a) (providing that a 
principal may expel a student who is found on school property or at a school function in 
possession of a dangerous weapon or a controlled substance or who assaults a staff mem-
ber). Although sections 37H and 37H½ invite discretionary application and are therefore 
not true zero tolerance laws, administrators across the state often apply them as though 
they are not discretionary. See infra Part III.B. 
10 See § 37H½. The Massachusetts House of Representatives passed the law on December 
22, 1993, and the Senate passed it the next day. Advisory Opinion on Student Discipline: Attach-
ment 3, Mass. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ. ( Jan. 27, 1994), 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/advisory/discipline/AOSD1.html (follow “Attachment 3: 
Chapter 380 of the Acts of 1993” hyperlink). Governor William F. Weld approved the law on 
January 4, 1994. See id. The law became effective on April 4, 1994. Robert V. Antonucci, Advi-
sory Opinion on Student Discipline, Mass. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ. 
( Jan. 27, 1994), http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/advisory/discipline/AOSD1.html. Michi-
gan, another state with tough expulsion laws, limits expellable offenses to possessing a dan-
gerous weapon, committing arson, or committing criminal sexual conduct and applies only if 
those crimes occur in a school building or on school grounds. See Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 380.1311(2) (2005). 
11 § 37H½(1); see infra note 115 (detailing procedural protections under 37H½). Section 
37H½ does not define “substantial detrimental effect,” nor does it give any guidelines on the 
determination in each case, leaving ample discretion in the hands of the administrator. See 
§ 37H½. The expansive definition of a felony in Massachusetts means that students are sub-
ject to exclusion under 37H½ for a broad range of conduct. See id.; supra note 4. 
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student is found guilty of the felony charge, the principal is further 
empowered to expel the student.12 Significantly, 37H1/2 also states: 
“Upon expulsion of such student, no school or school district shall be 
required to provide educational services to such student.”13 Once a 
student is expelled from one school in the Commonwealth, no other 
school is required to provide that student with an education.14 Though 
some cities and towns choose to provide alternative education for stu-
dents who are excluded (suspended or expelled), they are not required 
to do so and funding considerations dictate that many do not.15 
 The Massachusetts legislature has considered and rejected several 
attempts to change the law.16 Nevertheless, House Bill 178, which State 
Representative Alice K. Wolf of Cambridge filed on January 19, 2011, 
provides a new opportunity to reconsider 37H1/2.17 House Bill 178, enti-
                                                                                                                      
 
12 See § 37H½(2). 
13 Id. 
14 See id. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) protects the educa-
tional opportunities of special education students even when they are expelled for misbe-
havior. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006); Antonucci, supra note 10. IDEA does not simi-
larly protect the educational opportunities of general education students. See Antonucci, 
supra note 10. There are also educational opportunities for students incarcerated with the 
Department of Youth Services (DYS) in Massachusetts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 18A, § 2 
(2008) (“The department shall provide . . . services and facilities for the . . . education, 
training and rehabilitation of all children and youth referred or committed [to the de-
partment by the courts].”). Although 37H½ affects special education students and those 
who are ultimately committed to DYS, this Note focuses on general education students 
who are “expelled to nowhere” and are not guaranteed alternative education after expul-
sion from school. See infra Parts II–III. “Expelled to nowhere” is a term of art that first ap-
peared in a 2003 law review article. See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and 
You’re Out? Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 
65, 107 (2003). In this Note, the term refers to students who are expelled and do not re-
ceive alternative educational services. See id. 
15 See Parkins v. Boule, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 331, 341–42 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1994), 
available at 1994 WL 879558 (lamenting the lack of alternative educational options for 
excluded children while recognizing the mandate of the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) 
that an expelled student, under current law, has no right to alternative education); Amy E. 
Mulligan, Note, Alternative Education in Massachusetts: Giving Every Student a Chance to Suc-
ceed, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 629, 631 (1997) (discussing the Education Reform Act, which 
established a commission to study the feasibility of universal alternative education and 
calling the gap in educational services for those excluded “intolerable”); Antonucci, supra 
note 10 (acknowledging a gap in services for those students who are neither eligible for 
special education nor incarcerated). 
16 See Flint, supra note 1; Jordana Hart, More Pupils Ousted for Year, Without Backup, Re-
port Says, Bos. Globe, Feb. 12, 1998, at B1. 
17 H.R. 178, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011). The most recent effort to amend 37H½ 
was in 2009. See H.R. 3435, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009). A hearing on the 2009 bill 
(House Bill 3435) was held on November 10, 2009. See An Act to Help Students Stay in School: 
Hearing on H.R. 3435 Before the J. Comm. on Educ., 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009) [herein-
after H.R. 3435 Hearing], available at http://www.massadvocates.org/documents (follow hy-
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tled “An Act Relative to Students’ Access to Educational Services and 
Exclusion from School,” proposes several key changes to the law that 
strike an appropriate balance between school safety and educational 
opportunity for Massachusetts students.18 
 Of course, each school in Massachusetts must be afforded the lati-
tude to preserve decorum, both in service of safety and to create an 
optimal learning environment.19 Section 37H1/2, however, is overbroad 
because it affords schools the opportunity to regulate conduct that oc-
curs off school grounds and to permanently end a student’s educa-
tional opportunities.20 Part I of this Note discusses the evolution and 
effects of the zero tolerance movement, both nationwide and in Massa-
chusetts. Part II describes the application of 37H1/2 in Massachusetts. 
Part III argues that 37H1/2 is unconstitutional. Section A argues that a 
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right. Section B argues 
that 37H1/2 violates students’ procedural due process rights. Section C 
argues that 37H1/2 violates students’ rights to equal protection. Finally, 
Part IV discusses House Bill 178 and proposes that the Massachusetts 
legislature adopt the bill because it furthers the legitimate state interest 
of keeping schools safe without infringing upon the constitutional 
rights of students. Part IV also proposes further changes to the law that 
House Bill 178 does not address. 
I. The Evolution and Effects of “Zero Tolerance” 
 Across the nation, reports of youth violence and school shootings 
during the 1990s increased the public perception that “American chil-
dren ha[d] become Public Enemy #1.”21 In 1993, a Massachusetts ap-
                                                                                                                      
 
perlinks for individual testimonies). The November 2009 hearing is the most recent in-
stance of testimony on 37H½, therefore statements made at the hearing will be used 
throughout this Note to support arguments in favor of amending 37H½, despite the fact 
that House Bill 3435 is no longer pending. See id. 
18 See Mass. H.R. 178. 
19 See Hart, supra note 16 (quoting Education Commissioner Robert Antonucci’s 
statements that “[s]uspending and expelling some disruptive students will strengthen the 
climate for learning” and that “[s]afe schools are a top priority”). 
20 See Flint, supra note 1. 
21 Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track, Advancement Project et 
al., 11 (Mar. 2005), http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
FINALEOLrep.pdf; see Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile 
Justice Reforms As Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 511, 514, 537 (2009) 
(calling attention to racial imagery and warnings of “youthful superpredators” from politi-
cians and the media and reporting that in 1993, 48% of network news segments and 40% 
of newspaper articles about youth concerned violence). Though the national mood was 
decidedly fearful and media coverage of crime was on the rise, crime rates were actually 
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peals court ruled that a public school could not prevent a student from 
attending who had been found delinquent by reason of a homicide 
that occurred off school property during the summer.22 The court 
found that public policy in the Commonwealth dictated that “‘students 
should not be expelled from school for reasons having nothing to do 
with school.’”23 The Legislature enacted 37H1/2 to overturn the court’s 
ruling and to ensure that schools had the power to expel students for 
off-campus activity.24 Nationwide, politicians capitalized on similar fears 
to enact laws that were “tough on crime.”25 The timing was perfect; the 
public largely supported the adoption of harsh laws regulating student 
behavior in and out of school.26 
 The national impulse to get tough on juvenile crime, both in and 
out of school, was mirrored by a similar shift in the rhetoric of the na-
tion’s juvenile courts away from rehabilitation and towards punish-
                                                                                                                      
decreasing, both in the juvenile population and overall. Anthony J. DeMarco, Suspen-
sion/Expulsion—Punitive Sanctions from the Jail Yard to the School Yard, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
565, 565 (2000) (reporting that, during the 1990s, crime decreased 13% but media cover-
age of crime increased 240%); Kim Brooks et al., Justice Policy Inst. & Children’s Law Ctr., 
Inc., School House Hype: Two Years Later, Just. Pol’y Inst., 4, 6 (Apr. 2000), http://www. 
justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-04_REP_SchoolHouseHype2_JJ.pdf (reporting a 56% 
decline in juvenile homicide arrests, a 40% decrease in school-associated violent deaths, 
and a one-in-two-million chance that a child would die in a school). 
22 Antonucci, supra note 10 (discussing Petruzzelli v. Shawsheen Reg’l Technical High 
Sch., No. 1993-J-237 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 7, 1993) (case unavailable)); see Flint, supra note 1. 
23 Antonucci, supra note 10 (quoting Petruzzelli, No. 1993-J-237). 
24 See id. 
25 See Beale, supra note 21, at 520–21, 533 (“Between 1992 and 1995, . . . forty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia made changes in their laws targeting juveniles who 
commit serious or violent crimes.”); James Bell & Raquel Mariscal, Race and Ethnicity in 
Juvenile Justice, in Juvenile Justice: Advancing Research, Policy, and Practice (Fran-
cine Sherman & Francine Jacobs eds., forthcoming Oct. 2011); Heather Cobb, Symposium 
Response, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of School-Based Referrals to Juvenile Court, 
44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 581, 583 (2009) (stating that prominent politicians convinced 
colleagues and the public that the nation’s classrooms were filling with superpredators); 
Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: 
Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1039, 1045–46 (2001). Enacted in 
1994, the Gun-Free Schools Act fueled the development of zero tolerance policies for 
weapons possession and other offenses. Cobb, supra, at 586; see 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1) 
(2006) (“Each State receiving Federal funds under any subchapter of this chapter shall 
have in effect a State law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a 
period of not less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a firearm to a 
school, or to have possessed a firearm at a school . . . .”). 
26 See Flint, supra note 1; see also Paul M. Bogos, Note, “Expelled. No Excuses. No Excep-
tions.” —Michigan’s Zero-Tolerance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 
74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 357, 364, 367–68 (1997) (suggesting that harsh measures help the 
state perform its duty to provide children a learning environment). 
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ment.27 The U.S. Supreme Court extended the rights of defendants in 
adult criminal trials to juveniles, which protected the procedural due 
process rights of juveniles but also tended to shift the focus away from 
rehabilitation and towards punishment.28 Massachusetts juvenile courts 
followed suit, adopting an offense-based sentencing grid, repudiating 
the infancy defense, and developing a high reliance on commitment to 
the Department of Youth Services.29 These changes stood in stark con-
trast to the beliefs underlying the juvenile court system since its incep-
tion—namely that children are different from adults and should there-
fore be treated differently—and in spite of scientific research indicating 
that children’s brains are not fully matured.30 In Massachusetts, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
27 See Barry C. Feld, The Politics of Race and Juvenile Justice: The “Due Process Revolution” 
and the Conservative Reaction, 20 Just. Q. 765, 774–75 (2003) (“Gault and its progeny pre-
cipitated a procedural revolution that unintentionally, but inevitably, transformed the ju-
venile court from its original Progressive conception of a social welfare agency into a legal 
one. . . . [and] altered juvenile courts’ focus from ‘real needs’ to ‘criminal deeds’. . . .”); 
Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary Juvenile 
Court, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 33, 45–46 (2007) (citing the enactment of state laws eliminating 
or reducing the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings, opening delin-
quency proceedings to the public, allowing various agencies access to records of juvenile 
court proceedings, facilitating the transfer of children from the juvenile justice system to 
the criminal justice system, and expanding sentencing options in juvenile courts). 
28 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (“[T]he preservation of order 
and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as 
well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if 
undertaken by an adult.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–68 (1970) (holding that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is required in juvenile proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
30–31, 33, 36, 55 (1967) (holding that due process requires that a juvenile must be given 
adequate notice of the charges against him or her, the assistance of counsel, and the right 
against self-incrimination); Feld, supra note 27, at 774–75; William Haft, More Than Zero: 
The Cost of Zero Tolerance and the Case for Restorative Justice in Schools, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 795, 
797, 801 (2000) (suggesting that zero tolerance policies and restrictions on constitutional 
rights in the public schools are consistent with trends away from lenity in criminal law and 
contradict the premise that children are incapable of criminal mens rea); Kaban & Or-
lando, supra note 27, at 44–45 (citing the shift from rehabilitation to punishment). 
29 Kaban & Orlando, supra note 27, at 60–61. DYS is the juvenile justice agency of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts responsible for detaining and treating juveniles commit-
ted to its care by the courts. See Deborah Passarelli, Note, Department of Youth Services: Con-
trol over Sentencing and Monitoring of Juvenile Delinquents, 21 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. 
Confinement 575, 575–76 (1995). 
30 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 53 (2008) (”[A]s far as practicable, [juvenile defen-
dants] shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance. Proceedings against children under said sections shall not be deemed criminal 
proceedings.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–75 (2005) (holding that the death pen-
alty could not be imposed upon juvenile offenders because of their lack of maturity, their 
susceptibility to outside influences and peer pressure, and their still-developing character); 
Beale, supra note 21, at 514, 516; Kaban & Orlando, supra note 27, at 47–50 (citing studies 
confirming that brain immaturity in adolescents affects impulse control and the ability to 
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criminalization of juvenile court has increased the possibility that a ju-
venile will be charged with a higher-grade offense; if that offense is a 
felony, school authorities can invoke 37H1/2 and keep the student out of 
school.31 
 The zero tolerance movement focuses on the safety of schools and 
schoolchildren but does not account for the needs of the offending 
child or the long-term effects of school exclusion on the community at 
large.32 Zero tolerance policies eliminate a student’s ability to learn 
from his or her behavioral mistakes and decrease the possibility that an 
at-risk student will develop trusting relationships with school person-
nel.33 According to one study, students excluded from school are more 
likely to become involved in a physical fight, carry a weapon, smoke, 
use alcohol and drugs, and have sex.34 In addition, students who are 
excluded from school face higher risks of dropping out of school later 
                                                                                                                      
assess risk); Act Out, Get Out?: Considering the Impact of School Discipline Practices in Massachusetts, 
Rennie Ctr. for Educ. Res. & Pol’y, 4 (2010), http://renniecenter.issuelab.org/research/ 
listing/act_out_get_out_considering_the_impact_of_school_discipline_practices_in_mass- 
achusetts [hereinafter Act Out, Get Out?]. 
31 See Feld, supra note 27 at 772–75; Kaban & Orlando, supra note 27, at 44–45. De-
pending on the crime committed and past offenses, Massachusetts charges juveniles in 
juvenile court (potentially resulting in an adjudication of delinquency) or in adult court 
(potentially resulting in a guilty conviction). See § 54. Section 37H½ applies to juveniles 
with both delinquency adjudications and guilty convictions. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, 
§ 37H½(2) (2008). 
32 See Haft, supra note 28, at 796–97; Flint, supra note 1 (citing the conflict between ar-
guments that “schools must be kept safe at all costs” and the belief that “young people 
need to be led by the hand out of trouble—not kicked out of school at the precise time 
they need an education most”). 
33 Advancement Project & Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ., Opportunities 
Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline 
Policies 9–10 ( June 2000), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/digital-library/ 
publications/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-; De- 
Marco, supra note 21, at 571; Johanna Wald, Zeroing in on Rule-Breakers: ‘One Strike and You’re 
Out’ Rules Are Doing More Harm Than Good, Bos. Globe, Aug. 13, 2000, at F1 (arguing that 
subjecting a student who makes a mistake to the same consequence as a student who pur-
posefully breaks the law or a school rule “make[s] a mockery of . . . justice and fairness” and 
makes children suspicious and distrustful of adults); see also H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 
(statement of Joel M. Ristuccia, School Psychologist) (“When building principals rely heavily 
on student exclusion to achieve school safety, they create a school environment that is reac-
tive and punitive. Such school environments . . . distance students from school and negatively 
impact learning.”). 
34 Brooks et al., supra note 21, at 22–23; see H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement 
of Daniel J. Losen, Senior Education Law and Policy Associate, The Civil Rights Project at 
UCLA) (indicating that, although exclusion can be appropriate when students present a 
true danger to the school community, time away from school means that troubled students 
are unsupervised, increasing the risk of substance abuse and violent crime). 
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on (if readmitted), feeling isolated from society, committing further 
offenses, and becoming permanently court-involved.35 
 The consequences for a community that relies on exclusion as a 
disciplinary measure are also severe.36 A student who becomes involved 
in the criminal justice system costs the state much more money than a 
student who is sitting in a classroom.37 More fundamentally, if one pur-
pose of school is to educate productive members of society, a commu-
nity suffers when it refuses to educate all of its children, especially those 
with trouble exhibiting appropriate behavior.38 
 The public willingness to sanction such harsh consequences for 
the nation’s youth stands in contrast to the ideals and motivations be-
hind the nation’s most well-known education case, Brown v. Board of 
Education.39 In Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is 
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural val-
ues, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected 
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.40 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Haft, supra note 28, at 803; Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and the State Constitu-
tions: Alternatives for Suspended and Expelled Students, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 582, 605 (1996); 
Act Out, Get Out?, supra note 30, at 4–15; Brooks et al., supra note 21, at 4, 22. 
36 See Bogos, supra note 26, at 360; Hart, supra note 16 (“[N]othing positive can come 
of having hundreds of often troubled youngsters out of school . . . .”). 
37 See Bogos, supra note 26, at 386 (remarking that Michigan spends $5000 per year to 
educate a student in school but $23,000 per year when expelled students enter the juvenile 
justice system); see also H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Daniel J. Losen, 
Senior Education Law and Policy Associate, The Civil Rights Project at UCLA). 
38 See Haft, supra note 28, at 803. 
39 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, 
at 114–15. 
40 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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A similarly staunch commitment to education is also written into the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which states: 
[I]t shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all fu-
ture periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of 
literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; espe-
cially . . . public schools and grammar schools in the towns; 
. . . to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity 
and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry 
and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sin-
cerity, good humor, and all social affections, and generous 
sentiments among the people.41 
Despite these lofty sentiments, Massachusetts excludes over one hun-
dred students per year pursuant to 37H1/2.42 
II. The Application of Section 37H½ in Massachusetts 
The children we are banishing from our schools are the same children with 
whom we share an intertwined and interdependent future. . . . The students 
we expel from school will not disappear from society. We are in danger of not 
only creating an underclass, but creating an outclass that will come back to 
haunt us. 
—Isabel Raskin43 
 In April 1994, the Massachusetts legislature enacted 37H1/2.44 Be-
fore the end of the school year in June, schools had already excluded 
twelve students under 37H1/2.45 Over the course of the next three school 
years, exclusions hovered in the low sixties before spiking to 130 in the 
1997–1998 school year.46 Exclusions pursuant to 37H1/2 dipped back 
down to around one hundred per year for the following three years.47 
Since then, 37H1/2 has been applied to between 93 and 180 students per 
year.48 
                                                                                                                      
41 Mass. Const. ch. V, § II. The first public school in America opened in Massachu-
setts, and the Commonwealth enacted the nation’s first compulsory school attendance law 
in 1842. DeMarco, supra note 21, at 566. 
42 See infra Tables 1, 2. 
43 H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Isabel Raskin, Education Attorney, 
Suffolk University Juvenile Justice Center). 
44 Antonucci, supra note 10. 
45 See infra Table 1. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id.; infra Table 2. 
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 Though committed in their opposition to the law, advocates have 
had virtually no success reversing exclusions pursuant to 37H1/2 in Mas-
sachusetts courts, which almost universally defer to school administra-
tors’ decisions and rule against students.49 Even more troubling, how-
ever, is the fact that although 37H1/2 affected almost 1800 students 
between 1994 and 2010, not all of those cases received judicial, politi-
cal, or public notice.50 As one scholar notes, “many parents often do 
not have the mindset, time, or means to pursue redress against the 
educational ‘system’ beyond the administrative process through the 
courts, and the parents who do have the resources are often ostracized, 
frustrated, and unsuccessful.”51 Additionally, time is of the essence—a 
student who misses more than seven school days in six months is al-
ready at risk for retention (being held back in the same grade for a 
second year), to say nothing of missing months or an entire school year 
waiting for judicial action.52 For those families with the resources to do 
so, it is more expedient and more effective to pay for tutoring or pri-
vate school than to risk the negative effects of a total lack of education 
during the litigation process.53 
                                                                                                                      
49 See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054, 1056, 1058–
59 (Mass. 2002) (holding that the superintendent had acted within his discretion in sus-
pending a student charged with sexual assault); Doe v. Winchendon Sch. Comm., 18 Mass. 
L. Rptr. 53, 55 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 2, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1515905 (holding that 
the superintendent had acted within his discretion in expelling a student after he made 
“joke” bomb threats). 
50 See infra Tables 1, 2. Despite the many students excluded each year, there are only 
eight court or administrative cases that deal with student exclusions pursuant to 37H½. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Guy G., 758 N.E.2d 643, 647 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Winchendon, 18 
Mass. L. Rptr. at 55; Doe v. Sarno, No. 011835, 2001 WL 34048061, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 27, 2001), rev’d sub nom. Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054; Schaffer v. Hallion, 11 Mass. L. 
Rptr. 331, 331 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2000), available at 2000 WL 537242; Morales v. Bi-
aly, No. 97-2210 A, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 34, at *2 (Oct. 27, 1997); Medford Pub. Sch., 
16 MSER 191, 192–95 (Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals May 26, 2010), available at 
2010 MSE LEXIS 27; Harwich Pub. Sch., 13 MSER 188, 195 (Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. 
Appeals May 22, 2007), available at 2007 MSE LEXIS 28; Blue Hills Reg’l Technical Sch., 13 
MSER 25, 26 (Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals Feb. 14, 2007), available at 2007 MSE 
LEXIS 5. Decisions from the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals are also 
available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/bsea/decisions.html. 
51 Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a Nightmare? 
The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 289, 295 (2005). Students are often denied a 
remedy after being excluded under 37H½. See Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1059; Winchendon, 
28 Mass. L. Rptr. at 55; Morales, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 34, at *2; Blue Hills, 13 MSER at 
28, 29. 
52 See Hanson, supra note 51, at 358; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, § 1 (2008). 
53 See Hanson, supra note 51, at 358. 
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 The problems caused by 37H1/2 are vast, its application is over-
broad, and its benefits are uncertain, but the law has stood unchanged 
since its enactment in 1994.54 Popular support from key stakeholders 
has ensured that the law stays on the books.55 Principals and education 
officials worry about the possibility that a troubled youth could cause 
future incidents, bad publicity, and lawsuits if he or she is not ex-
cluded.56 Schools benefit because the students they expel are often the 
same students who score poorly on standardized tests that are used in 
school evaluations.57 Parents want disruptive students out of their chil-
dren’s classrooms.58 Teachers benefit from a policy that allows them to 
rid their classrooms of troublemakers.59 In the wake of highly publi-
cized school shootings throughout the late 1990s and beyond, the pub-
lic sympathizes with educators’ attempts to run safe schools and seems 
willing to forgive any resulting missteps.60 Virtually unanimous public 
support creates an absence of political pressure to change the law— 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless School Violence, Due 
Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An Examination of Fuller v. Decatur 
Public School Board of Education School District, 2002 BYU Educ. & L.J. 159, 161, 164, 
189; Flint, supra note 1; Hart, supra note 16; Wald, supra note 33. 
55 See Brady, supra note 54, at 161, 164, 189; Flint, supra note 1; Hart, supra note 16; 
Wald, supra note 33. 
56 See Flint, supra note 1. Concerns about school bullying nationwide and the enact-
ment of new anti-bullying legislation in Massachusetts have further increased the pressures 
on school administrators to maintain safety and order in their schools. See, e.g., Alyssa Gi-
acobbe, Who Failed Phoebe Prince?, Bos. Mag., June 2010, at 112, 128; Peter Schworm & 
Brian Ballou, 9 Teens Charged in Girl’s Bullying: S. Hadley School’s Officials Faulted for Not Halt-
ing Abuse Before Her Suicide, Bos. Globe, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
71, § 37O (Supp. 2010) (setting forth Massachusetts’ anti-bullying legislation, effective May 
3, 2010). 
57 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 68; Maureen Carroll, Comment, Educating 
Expelled Students After No Child Left Behind: Mending an Incentive Structure That Discourages 
Alternative Education and Reinstatement, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1909, 1929 (2008). No Child Left 
Behind, which Congress enacted in 2001 as a reauthorization of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act, demands that public schools show adequate yearly progress (AYP) 
towards full proficiency in reading and math. See Carroll, supra, at 1927–28. Schools face 
increasingly harsh consequences for every year they fail to make AYP and there is corre-
sponding pressure on principals to raise AYP at all costs. See id. at 1928. While ninety-five 
percent of enrolled students must participate in the standardized tests that factor into AYP, 
there is no requirement that schools allow any particular student to attend school. See id. at 
1927–28. By expelling low-scoring students, principals increase the probability of making 
AYP and escaping tough sanctions. See id. at 1928–29. Moreover, because minority students 
are often some of the lowest scoring students in schools, the exclusionary incentive applies 
with greater force to them. Id. at 1930. 
58 Flint, supra note 1. 
59 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 67–68. 
60 See id. at 65; Brady, supra note 54, at 159–60; Robert G. Fraser, Student Discipline from 
the Perspective of the School Attorney, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 573, 579 (2000); Flint, supra note 1. 
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thus, the Legislature has considered and turned down several bills that 
would lessen the impact of 37H1/2.61 
III. Section 37H½ Infringes on Students’ Fundamental 
Constitutional Right to a Minimally  
Adequate Education 
A. The Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education 
 Despite the recognized importance of education in American so-
ciety, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that education is not 
a fundamental right.62 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) has also held that there is no fundamental right to education in 
the Commonwealth.63 Nevertheless, both courts have indicated that a 
minimally adequate education may, in fact, be a fundamental right guar-
anteed by the U.S. and Massachusetts Constitutions.64 If the right to a 
                                                                                                                      
 
61 See Flint, supra note 1. In 1997, Massachusetts State Representative Patricia D. Jehlen 
of Somerville filed a bill that would impose more guidelines on principals seeking to expel 
students and would increase the protections of the appeals process, but that bill did not 
result in an amendment to 37H½. Id. In 1998, the State Legislature considered a bill spon-
sored by Representative Barbara Gardner of Hollison that would require bi-yearly hearings 
for excluded students attempting readmission into school and would prohibit the expul-
sion of students younger than eleven. Hart, supra note 16. This bill did not result in 
amendments to 37H½ either—in 2007, 37H½ was applied to a fourth-grade student. See E-
mail from Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ. (DESE) Admin., to author (Feb. 
17, 2010, 08:31 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2010 E-mail from DESE Admin.] 
(providing access to the 2007 statistics via a link that was live for seven days, in response to 
an e-mail sent to data@doe.mass.edu). In 2009, Representative Alice K. Wolf of Cambridge 
filed House Bill 3435, which would have made sweeping changes to the law. See H.R. 3435, 
2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009). House Bill 3435 did not make it out of committee 
before the end of the legislative session, and Representative Wolf filed House Bill 178 in 
January 2011. See H.R. 178, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011); infra Part IV. 
62 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (“Nor have we ac-
cepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ like equality of the fran-
chise, which should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual’s 
access to it.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Nor is education a fundamental 
right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in 
which education is provided to its population.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“We have carefully considered each of the arguments suppor-
tive of the District Court’s finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and 
have found those arguments unpersuasive.”). 
63 See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995) 
(holding that the Massachusetts Constitution does not guarantee the right to an educa-
tion). 
64 See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“[T]his Court has not yet de-
finitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental 
right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (holding that the 
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minimally adequate education is a fundamental one, its denial would 
be subject to strict scrutiny.65 Although there is certainly a compelling 
state interest in safe schools, 37H½ is not the most narrowly tailored 
means of achieving the state’s compelling interest and therefore fails 
strict scrutiny.66 
1. The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education Is of a Fundamental 
Nature 
 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that education was not a fundamental right.67 The 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez alleged that funding disparities between poor ur-
ban school districts and wealthy suburban school districts were uncon-
stitutional.68 The Court held that the funding disparities did not violate 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights because the funding scheme did not op-
erate to the detriment of a suspect class and because “lack of personal 
resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired 
benefit.”69 However, the Court stated that the “absolute denial of edu-
cational opportunities to any of [a state’s] children” may give rise to a 
charge that “the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”70 
                                                                                                                      
 
denial of a basic education requires a heightened level of scrutiny); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 
23–25 (suggesting that complete deprivation of education is unconstitutional); Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of 
the function of a State.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (“Without 
doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowl-
edge . . . .”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 606 (Mass. 
1993) (“[T]he Commonwealth has a duty to provide an education for all its children 
. . . .”); see also Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education Programs and 
Our Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 197, 208–16 (2009). 
65 See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17: see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish 
the State’s asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that 
purpose.”); infra Part III.A.2. 
66 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17, 36–37 (suggesting that if “some identifiable quantum of 
education” were a fundamental right, then its complete denial may trigger strict scrutiny); 
McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 (imposing a duty on cities and towns in Massachusetts to pro-
vide an adequate education to students and on the Commonwealth to ensure the mandate 
is carried out); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 109; infra Part III.A.2. 
67 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
68 Id. at 19–20. 
69 Id. at 22–25. 
70 Id. at 37. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan stated that “there can be no 
doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral proc-
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Thus, the absolute denial of educational benefits under 37H½ may be 
constitutionally significant.71 
 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly suggested that public education 
is deeply rooted in our nation’s history, values, and traditions and that 
an educated citizenry is a prerequisite to the continued functioning of 
our democratic system.72 Such deep roots in American society suggest 
that the right to receive a minimally adequate education is of a funda-
mental nature.73 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated that “some de-
gree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effec-
tively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
freedom and independence.”74 In Plyler v. Doe, the Court characterized 
the public schools “‘as a most vital civic institution for the preservation 
of a democratic system of government’” and distinguished public edu-
cation from “some governmental ‘benefit’” because of the “importance 
of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting im-
                                                                                                                      
ess and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment” 
and suggested that “any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict judi-
cial scrutiny.” Id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Also in dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
stated that the fundamental importance of education was demonstrated “by the prior deci-
sions of this Court, by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by 
the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional val-
ues.” Id. at 111 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Rodriguez Court “never rejected the nexus 
between education and the exercise of one’s constitutional rights” and the Court “ulti-
mately accepted the plaintiffs’ arguments and observed that, under a different set of facts, 
an ‘identifiable quantum of education’ could be a constitutionally protected prerequisite 
to the exercise of other fundamental rights.” Barbour, supra note 64, at 210; see Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. at 36 (majority opinion). The Court has also recognized that students have a lib-
erty right, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, against state barriers to learning. 
See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97, 399–400, 403 (holding that a state law prohibiting teaching 
foreign languages to students who had not yet passed the eighth grade unconstitutionally 
violated the students’ rights to learn). 
71 Barbour, supra note 64, at 210; see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36. 
72 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (noting the importance of education in maintaining 
basic national institutions); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213, 221 (“[A]s . . . pointed out early in our 
history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effec-
tively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and in-
dependence.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (“The American people have always regarded educa-
tion and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be 
diligently promoted.”). In fact, the Framers and early congresses promoted education as a 
central concern of the federal government. See Barbour, supra note 64, at 208–09. 
73 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“Appropriate limits on 
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 
‘respect for the teachings of history [and], solid recognition of the basic values that under-
lie our society.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
74 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
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pact of its deprivation on the life of the child.”75 Indeed, in Papasan v. 
Allain, the Court stated, “this Court has not yet definitively settled the 
question[] whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental 
right” but indicated that the case did not “require resolution” of the 
issue.76 Thus, the question of whether the U.S. Constitution protects 
the right to a minimally adequate education remains unresolved.77 
 Even if the U.S. Constitution does not provide complete protec-
tion for students excluded under 37H1/2, the Massachusetts Constitution 
and the education jurisprudence of the SJC strengthen the case that 
students in Massachusetts have a fundamental right to a minimally ade-
quate education.78 The SJC has held that there is no fundamental right 
to education in the Commonwealth.79 Even so, in McDuffy v. Secretary of 
the Executive Office of Education, the SJC held that the Commonwealth 
has a constitutional obligation to provide all public school students with 
                                                                                                                      
75 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see Barbour, supra note 64, at 209 & n.114. 
76 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285–86. In Papasan, students brought suit challenging Missis-
sippi’s distribution of public school land funds. Id. at 267–68. The Court stated, “The peti-
tioners do not allege that schoolchildren . . . are not taught to read or write; they do not 
allege that they receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they allege no actual 
facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived of a minimally adequate 
education.” Id. at 286. The Court therefore stated, “As we see it, we are not bound to credit 
and may disregard the allegation that the petitioners have been denied a minimally ade-
quate education.” Id. 
77 See id. at 285–86. 
78 See Mass. Const. ch. V, § II; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 523–28. The Massachusetts Con-
stitution directs the “legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this common-
wealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, . . . especially . . . public 
schools and grammar schools in the towns.” Mass. Const. ch. V, § II. The Rodriguez Court 
suggested that if a right is explicitly or implicitly mentioned in a state constitution, then 
that right is a fundamental right for the citizens of that state. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–
34. The education clause in the Massachusetts Constitution seems to pass this test, espe-
cially when the issue is the absolute denial of all educational opportunities in the Com-
monwealth. See Mass. Const. ch. V, § II; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23–25, 33–34. But see Bd. of 
Educ. v. Sch. Comm. of Quincy, 612 N.E.2d 666, 670 n.8 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the 
school attendance statute did not require the school committee to offer alternative educa-
tion to an expelled student); Parkins v. Boule, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 331, 341–42 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 3, 1994), available at 1994 WL 879558 (finding expulsion without the provision of 
alternative education constitutional). 
79 See, e.g., Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1095. The Massachusetts courts have affirmed schools’ 
ability to expel students for misconduct and have held that there is no right to an alternative 
education after expulsion. See Quincy, 612 N.E.2d at 670 n.8; Parkins, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. at 341–
42. The SJC stated, however, that it was for the legislature to determine whether and in what 
manner alternative education would be provided to expelled students. See Quincy, 612 N.E.2d 
at 670 n.8. This leaves room for the legislature to mandate the provision of alternative educa-
tion after expulsion. See id.; infra notes 171–172 and accompanying text (discussing the man-
date in House Bill 178 that principals provide alternative education to excluded students). 
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an “adequate” education.80 Further, the court held that the education 
provided had to “prepare [students] to participate as free citizens of a 
free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican govern-
ment.”81 
 In the inquiry into whether a right has been unconstitutionally 
infringed or merely burdened, courts consider “[t]he directness and 
substantiality of the interference.”82 In both Rodriguez and McDuffy, the 
issue was whether all students had the right to the same degree of edu-
cation.83 Conversely, in the case of 37H1/2, the issue is whether all stu-
dents have the right to some degree of education.84 Unlike in Rodriguez 
and McDuffy, where students had access to educational services, 37H1/2 
leaves many students without even the minimally adequate education 
both the Rodriguez Court and the McDuffy court suggested was constitu-
tionally guaranteed.85 
2. The Denial of a Minimally Adequate Education Fails Strict Scrutiny 
 If a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right, courts 
would subject permanent exclusion under 37H½ to strict scrutiny.86 
Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that a 
law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose and that 
the law is narrowly tailored, meaning that it is the least restrictive means 
of achieving that purpose.87 The Commonwealth would likely be able to 
satisfy the first prong and prove that 37H1/2 serves a compelling state in-
                                                                                                                      
80 See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 545, 554–55. 
81 Id. at 548. 
82 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87, 387 n.12 (1978). 
83 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11–17; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548. 
84 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008) (providing for permanent exclusion 
from Massachusetts schools after expulsion). The argument that “expulsion to nowhere” 
violates equal protection is unlike the arguments advanced in both Rodriguez and McDuffy. 
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 552. In both cases, students argued 
that funding disparities between schools violated equal protection. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
at 28; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 552. Even so, every student had the opportunity to sit in a 
classroom and learn; under 37H½ that opportunity is denied to some. See § 37H½; Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. at 37; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 519. Between 1993 and 2003, only 49.8% to 
68.0% of excluded general education students received alternative education, leaving 
many students without any educational resources. See infra Table 1. After 2003, changing 
methods of categorizing disciplinary actions makes drawing firm conclusions about the 
exact percentage of general education students receiving alternative education difficult. 
See infra Table 2. 
85 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 521–22. 
86 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942); Wald, supra note 33. 
87 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17, 97. 
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terest by citing the need to create safe and productive educational envi-
ronments.88 It is difficult to dispute the 1998 statements of the Com-
monwealth’s Education Commissioner, Robert Antonucci, that 
“[s]uspending and expelling some disruptive students will strengthen 
the climate for learning” and that “[s]afe schools are a top priority.”89 In 
addition, Massachusetts courts defer to the decisions of educators be-
cause of the inescapable fact that “[s]chool officials have a duty to ‘pro-
vide a safe and secure environment in which all children can learn.’”90 
 Despite the compelling state interest in keeping schools safe, 
37H1/2 is not the least restrictive or most narrowly tailored way of achiev-
ing that purpose.91 First, 37H1/2 gives principals discretion to take action 
against a student without regard to the actual crime the student has 
committed.92 While the continued presence in school of a student 
charged with sexually assaulting another child may indeed have “a sub-
stantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the school,” the 
presence of a student charged with felony theft may not be quite so 
detrimental.93 In the latter case, a student who steals an iPhone, a bicy-
cle, or an expensive jacket is subject to the same consequence of expul-
sion as a student who sexually molests another child.94 
                                                                                                                      
 
88 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 108. 
89 See Hart, supra note 16. But see H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Mar-
tha P. Grace, C.J., Juvenile Court Department (retired)) (“[K]eeping children in school, if 
possible, is a public safety imperative.”). Antonucci served as the Commissioner of Educa-
tion from 1992 to 1998. Robert V. Antonucci, Statement by Massachusetts Commissioner of Edu-
cation Robert V. Antonucci, Mass. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ. (Feb. 
4, 1998), http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.aspx?id=1156. 
90 See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Mass. 2002) 
(quoting Worcester, 653 N.E.2d at 1096). 
91 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280; Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 
1246 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that disciplinary measures are a deprivation of substantive due 
process when they are “arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal 
of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning”); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, 
at 109–10 (noting that a state may not constitutionally utilize “expulsion-to-nowhere” when 
“‘there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the state’s] goals with a lesser burden on con-
stitutionally protected activity’” (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972))). 
92 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008); Wald, supra note 33 (“Zero tolerance 
laws treat all offenses falling within certain categories with equal severity, regardless of 
intent, mitigating circumstances, or previous record.”). 
93 See § 37H½(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30 (2008) (defining felony theft as theft 
of anything worth more than $250); Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1056–57 (upholding a prin-
cipal’s exclusion of a student charged with “indecent assault and battery on a child under 
the age of fourteen years, and rape and abuse of a child”). 
94 See § 37H½ (allowing principals to suspend or expel students charged with or con-
victed of any felony). Moreover, three different students could have committed the same 
offense and receive different treatment after exclusion. See id.; see also Blumenson & Nil-
sen, supra note 14, at 109. A special education student has a right to receive alternative 
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 Commissioner Antonucci recognized the potential for overly 
broad applications of 37H1/2 in an advisory opinion, stating: 
Because of the range of offenses included in the term felony, 
educational professionals should view the circumstances of 
each case carefully and make a reasoned determination 
whether the specific conduct underlying the felony charge or 
conviction can support the required finding that the student’s 
continued presence would have a substantial detrimental ef-
fect on the general welfare of the school.95 
Though the Commissioner urged restraint, there is ample indication 
that principals have applied 37H1/2 indiscriminately and have not 
heeded the call to carefully consider each case.96 Therefore, even if the 
official policy is that a student should only be expelled if the student’s 
continued presence would truly have a detrimental effect on the gen-
eral welfare of the school, school officials seem to have jettisoned those 
guidelines in favor of exclusion in less serious cases.97 
 In addition, 37H1/2 is not narrowly tailored to further the goal of 
school safety because it allows punishment for crimes occurring outside 
the school day, off school property, and without regard to the individu-
als involved in the incident.98 Such punishment does not fit the crime 
because students are subject to school-based sanctions for their off-
                                                                                                                      
education from the state under IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). A general 
education student committed to DYS will also receive alternative education in the deten-
tion facility. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 18A, § 2 (2008). The third student, a general education 
student not committed to DYS, does not have the right to receive alternative education at 
all. See Parkins, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. at 341–42 (stating that students expelled from school do 
not have a right to alternative education). 
95 Antonucci, supra note 10. 
96 See H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Phillip Kassel, Advocacy Director, 
South Coastal Counties Legal Services) (“The notion that school administrators should 
have no patience for violence and drugs in schools has morphed into blanket permission 
to utilize nearly unreviewable discretion to damage kids[’] lives for reasons that often do 
not relate to school safety.”); Flint, supra note 1. 
97 See H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Phillip Kassel, Advocacy Director, 
South Coastal Counties Legal Services); Flint, supra note 1. 
98 See § 37H½ (allowing punishment for a felony charge or conviction without regard 
to when and where the alleged offense took place); H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 
(statement of John L. Reed, Education Chair, NAACP New England Area Conference) 
(“The concept of due process has always been a major issue with [37H½] because of the 
provision that indicates a student may be subject to school disciplinary actions after school, 
on the weekends, off school property, and [based on] any court-related matter if it is 
brought to the attention of school administration.”). 
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campus activities.99 While crimes occurring during the school day, on 
school property, or involving school community members might justify 
the harsh penalties prescribed by 37H1/2, a crime happening outside of 
school hours, off school property, and involving no school community 
members gives rise to a much weaker inference that a student’s pres-
ence in school is detrimental.100 These differentiations would not be 
difficult to write into the law.101 
 Further, if a student’s out-of-school conduct has garnered the at-
tention of the juvenile justice system, that student is already answering 
for his or her conduct in court.102 A student should not also face pun-
ishment at school, especially when that student’s conduct is unrelated 
to his or her behavior at school.103 Otherwise, a student is doubly pun-
ished for only “one act of childish misconduct.”104 
 Finally, long-term or permanent exclusion of students charged 
with or convicted of felonies is not the least restrictive means of ensur-
ing the safety of other children.105 Services such as alternative educa-
tion, counseling, and in-school suspension (removal to another loca-
tion in the school) are currently or potentially available at every school 
in Massachusetts.106 Expansion of these existing services is a more nar-
rowly tailored way of furthering the state interest in keeping schools 
safe.107 Though these services cost money and, in the short term, cost 
much more than simply kicking a student out of school, the long-term 
costs of permanent expulsion likely outstrip the short-term costs of 
educating a child after a felony exclusion.108 Moreover, “surprisingly 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Brady, supra note 54, at 176 (stating that a substantive due process inquiry in-
cludes the question of “[w]hether the punishment fits the crime”). 
100 See id. Expulsion from school for activity occurring outside of school arguably does 
not meet this test in all situations. See id. 
101 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1311(2) (2005); H.R. 3435, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. 
(Mass. 2009) (listing factors for administrators to consider, including the involvement of 
school community members and the alleged incident’s proximity to school). 
102 See Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track, supra note 21, at 7 (stat-
ing that the “double dose of punishment” is the result of school districts teaming up with 
law enforcement to create a schoolhouse to jailhouse track). 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Brady, supra, note 54, at 176. 
106 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.530 (2010). IDEA requires that if a school removes a special 
education student from school for more than ten days after a violation of a code of con-
duct, the school must provide continued educational services to the student. See id. Be-
cause IDEA mandates alternative education for special education students, every district 
has alternative education services in place. See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See Bogos, supra note 26, at 386 (noting that prison costs more than school). 
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little evidence” exists documenting the effectiveness of zero tolerance 
policies in reducing school violence.109 If the statute does not further 
the Commonwealth’s pursuit of school safety, the statute is unconstitu-
tional at any level of review.110 
B. The Constitutionally Deficient Procedures of Section 37H1/2 
 Section 37H1/2 deprives students of procedural due process because 
the procedures outlined in 37H1/2 are not “fundamentally fair.”111 In 
Goss v. Lopez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that students have a prop-
erty interest in an education and a liberty interest in their reputation 
and that access to education should not be limited unless pursuant to 
fundamentally fair procedures.112 The Court also held that “some kind 
of notice” and “some kind of hearing” were required before suspensions 
of ten days or less.113 The Court further noted, “Longer suspensions or 
                                                                                                                      
109 Wald, supra note 33; see Act Out, Get Out?, supra note 30, at 4. 
110 See Adira Siman, Note, Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for 
Students of Color, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 327, 344–45 (2005). Even if the courts ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny, the burden would still be on the government to prove that the 
law is substantially related to an important governmental purpose, and the means chosen 
must be a more than reasonable way of achieving that goal. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217–18, 
218 n.16, 230 (applying intermediate scrutiny to analyze the denial of public education to 
undocumented immigrant children and holding that Texas had not met its burden); Blu-
menson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 108 n.171. Even subjected to rational basis review, 
37H½ is still unconstitutional because it is not rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 14, at 110–11. “Despite nearly two decades of im-
plementation of zero tolerance policy and its application to mundane and non-violent 
misbehavior, there is no evidence that frequent reliance on removing misbehaving stu-
dents improves school safety or student behavior.” H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 
(statement of Daniel J. Losen, Senior Education Law and Policy Associate, The Civil Rights 
Project at UCLA). In the absence of evidence that 37H½ is making the Commonwealth’s 
schools safer, the law is not a reasonable means of achieving the goal of school safety. See 
Siman, supra, at 344–45; Wald, supra note 33. The availability of alternate means to secure 
school safety and to differentiate between students who are truly dangerous and students 
who merely need some guidance further illustrates the irrationality of permanent expul-
sion. See Siman, supra, at 344–45. 
111 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
112 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574–75. In Goss, various high school students were suspended 
without a hearing and sued the school district, alleging procedural due process violations. 
Id. at 567. 
113 See id. at 579. 
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expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may 
require more formal procedures.”114 
 An analysis under Goss shows that the procedural safeguards out-
lined in 37H1/2 do not satisfy the constitutional standard.115 First, 37H1/2 
does not mandate that a school provide a hearing to a student before 
excluding him or her from school.116 The law merely states, “The stu-
dent shall receive written notification of the charges and the reasons 
for such suspension [or expulsion] prior to such suspension [or expul-
sion] taking effect.”117 The student may appeal the principal’s decision 
and receive a hearing, but must remain out of school until the hearing 
occurs.118 Providing a right to a hearing only on appeal is in direct con-
flict with the Goss requirement that a hearing must accompany any sus-
pension of ten days or less.119 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 Id. at 584. In addition, Goss highlights the lack of investigatory care and potential 
procedural violations stemming from exclusions that are the result of conduct occurring 
off school grounds. See id. at 580–81 n.9. 
115 See id. at 574, 576, 584. Notice and hearing procedures for suspensions are detailed 
in 37H½: 
The student shall have the right to appeal the suspension to the superinten-
dent. The student shall notify the superintendent in writing of his request for 
an appeal no later than five calendar days following the effective date of the 
suspension. The superintendent shall hold a hearing with the student and the 
student’s parent or guardian within three calendar days of the student’s re-
quest for an appeal. At the hearing, the student shall have the right to present 
oral and written testimony on his behalf, and shall have the right to counsel. 
The superintendent shall have the authority to overturn or alter the decision 
of the principal or headmaster, including recommending an alternate educa-
tional program for the student. The superintendent shall render a decision 
on the appeal within five calendar days of the hearing. Such decision shall be 
the final decision of the city, town or regional school district with regard to 
the suspension. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½(1) (2008). The procedures for expulsions are the same 
as for suspensions. See § 37H½(2) (substituting “expulsion” for “suspension” throughout). 
116 See § 37H½. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. In addition, anything a student says at a principal’s or superintendent’s hearing 
may be used against the student in the felony prosecution. Telephone Interview with Bar-
bara Kaban, Deputy Dir./Dir. of Research & Policy, Children’s Law Ctr. of Mass. (Mar. 12, 
2010); see H.R. 178, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011) (requiring that a student be pro-
vided with “notice that statements at [a] hearing may be used against the student in inves-
tigative or criminal or delinquency proceedings”). Principals and superintendents want to 
know if a student committed the charged offense, and a student without counsel does not 
know to remain silent in the face of questioning. See Telephone Interview with Barbara 
Kaban, supra. Because most students are not represented by counsel at these hearings, the 
possibility of self-incrimination is high. Id. 
119 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579, 584; H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Phillip 
Kassel, Advocacy Director, South Coastal Counties Legal Services) (“Under current prac-
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 Despite the clear two-pronged test under 37H1/2, the second 
prong—the “dangerousness determination” —is either meaningless or 
fully collapses into the first prong—the felony charge or conviction.120 
In Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Stoughton, the SJC confirmed the ex-
istence of a two-pronged inquiry when it stated that “more than a fel-
ony charge is required to impose suspension” under 37H1/2.121 Just a few 
sentences later, however, the SJC stated that 37H1/2 “does not prohibit 
the principal from drawing an inference of detrimental effect based on 
the nature of the crime alone.”122 Even after such inexact statutory 
compliance by schools, judges tend to defer to a principal’s decision to 
exclude a student unless that decision is “arbitrary and capricious, so as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion.”123 According to the SJC, “Because 
school officials are in the best position to determine when a student’s 
actions threaten the safety and welfare of other students, we must grant 
school officials substantial deference in their disciplinary choices.”124 
 When permanent expulsion is at stake, the procedures afforded by 
37H1/2 are not “fundamentally fair,” as required by the Goss Court, and 
do not adequately protect a student’s property interest in his or her 
education.125 There is no hearing, no meaningful judicial review, and a 
                                                                                                                      
tice, the decision to exclude a student from school long-term is accompanied by less proc-
ess than, for example, an appeal of a decision to assess a surcharge on a driver’s insurance 
premium.”). Compare § 37H½ (providing for no hearings, even in cases of permanent ex-
clusion), with Mass. H.R. 178 (providing detailed hearing procedures for exclusions of ten 
or more days). 
120 See Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1058; see also § 37H½. Before excluding a student under 
37H½, a principal must have (1) evidence of a felony charge or conviction; and (2) must 
determine that “the student’s continued presence in school would have a substantial det-
rimental effect on the general welfare of the school.” § 37H½. Despite the two-pronged 
test, “suspension upon the charge of a ‘felony,’ . . . is nearly automatic.” H.R. 3435 Hearing, 
supra note 17 (statement of Phillip Kassel, Advocacy Director, South Coastal Counties Le-
gal Services). 
121 Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1058. 
122 Id. Though the crime at issue in Stoughton, the sexual assault of a minor, is admit-
tedly quite shocking, the fact remains that the court allowed the principal to treat the dan-
gerousness determination as flowing from the felony charge instead of basing it on a sepa-
rate inquiry. See id.; Parkins, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. at 336 (noting that a student’s suicide attempts 
were sufficient to determine that she was a danger to others). 
123 See Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1057–58 (noting “substantial deference” to school offi-
cials in matters of discipline in the absence of arbitrary and capricious action); Brady, su-
pra note 54, at 162. 
124 See Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1057. While it is undoubtedly true that school officials 
are in the best place to determine dangerousness, they are also subject to bias and their 
decisions about expulsion—especially expulsion for acts that did not occur in school—
should be subject to meaningful judicial review. See Flint, supra note 1 (discussing princi-
pals’ broad application of the power to exclude under 37H½). 
125 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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lack of compliance with the terms of the statute.126 The procedures af-
forded by 37H1/2 and the lesser procedures actually followed by schools 
and courts do not meet the standard set in Goss for suspensions of ten 
days or less; therefore, they do not meet the standard necessary for a 
complete denial of educational opportunity.127 
C. The Discriminatory Effects and Disparate Impact of Section 37H1/2 
 Section 37H1/2 is also constitutionally suspect because minority stu-
dents are over-represented in exclusion statistics, raising equal protec-
tion concerns.128 Classification based on race is subject to strict scrutiny 
because of the history of de jure and de facto racial discrimination in 
this nation.129 Even so, when a contested law is facially neutral, the Su-
preme Court has held that there is no equal protection violation without 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008); Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d at 1058–59. 
127 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576, 579. 
128 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Bell & Mariscal, supra note 25 (stating that 
while zero tolerance policies appear race-neutral, they have a discriminatory effect and 
propel youth of color into the juvenile justice system); see also Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are uncon-
stitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”); Skinner, 
316 U.S. at 536, 541 (holding that a law requiring the sterilization of individuals convicted 
three times for crimes of “moral turpitude” unconstitutionally violated equal protection 
because it infringed on the fundamental right of procreation); Wald, supra note 33; infra 
Tables 1, 2. A common measure of whether a group is disproportionately affected is 
whether its proportion in the target classification (here, students excluded under 37H½) 
exceeds its representation in the population by ten percent of that classification. See Rus-
sell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in 
School Punishment, Ind. Educ. Pol’y Center, 3–4 ( June 2000), http://www.indiana.edu/ 
~safeschl/cod.pdf. For example, if African American students made up twenty percent of 
the student population and more than twenty-two or less than eighteen percent of ex-
cluded students were African American, then the law would have a disproportionate effect 
on African American students. Id. 
129 See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and 
Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1076 (1979); Carroll, supra note 57, at 1913 (not-
ing that the history of legal racism compels a closer look at the denial of alternative educa-
tion to expelled students because it further widens the achievement gap between minority 
and white students). The Supreme Court stated: “A core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on 
race. Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice 
than legitimate public concerns . . . .” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citation 
omitted). Additionally, the nation’s history of race-based discrimination makes it less likely 
that the political process will protect racial minorities and more likely that states will pass 
laws that disproportionately impact minority groups, thus calling for a “correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.” See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938); Carroll, supra note 57, at 1913. 
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proof of a discriminatory purpose.130 Despite the profound impact of 
racism on laws and on the behavior of citizens, however, racist motives 
are rarely expressed and are difficult to prove.131 Some scholars suggest 
that, because analyzing the presence of discriminatory intent “does not 
tell the whole story,” courts should use a standard that considers the ef-
fects of discrimination.132 Under an effects test, “any action that has the 
same effects as obvious discrimination—the same insulting, stigmatizing, 
or subordinating effects—should also be unconstitutional.”133 
 Decades after Brown mandated equality of opportunity in educa-
tion, students of color do not have the same educational opportunities 
as white students.134 In addition, African American students are ex-
                                                                                                                      
 
130 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that, in order to 
demonstrate an equal protection violation, the defendant “must prove that the decision-
makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55, 67 (1980) (holding that an election system that disadvantaged minorities would not be 
subject to strict scrutiny unless there was purposeful discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (noting that the Court had never found that a racially dispropor-
tionate impact, standing alone, violated equal protection). But see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (invalidating a facially neutral law that was enforced in a racially 
disparate manner). In contrast, the SJC has suggested that no discriminatory purpose is 
necessary to claim an equal protection violation under the Massachusetts Constitution. See 
Sch. Comm. of Springfield v. Bd. of Educ., 319 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Mass. 1974) (holding that 
“regardless of legislative intent . . . , any action taken . . . which would tend to reverse or 
impede the progress toward the achievement of racial balance in Springfield’s schools 
would constitute a violation of . . . arts. 1 and 10 of the . . . Massachusetts Constitution”); 
see also Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I (ratified as amended in 1976) (“Equality under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”). 
Therefore, proof of disparate impact may be enough for a Massachusetts court to hold 
37H1/  unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection. See Springfield, 319 N.E.2d at 434. 2
131 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 355–56 (1987) (suggesting that a “cultural meaning 
test” is the best way to discover the unconscious or indirect source of racially discrimina-
tory acts); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
935, 960, 962 (1989) (suggesting a test which focuses on effects as well as intent). 
132 See Strauss, supra note 131, at 962. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp., the Supreme Court stated that proof of discriminatory impact might 
provide “an important starting point” in an equal protection claim. See 429 U.S. 252, 265–
66 (1977). Proof of discriminatory impact may create an inference of discriminatory in-
tent. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242. Students challenging racially disproportionate expul-
sions under the Equal Protection Clause, however, had no success in Fuller v. Decatur Public 
School Board of Education School District 61, where a court held that evidence of racially dis-
parate school discipline policies did not violate equal protection in the absence of a dis-
criminatory purpose. See 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825 (C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
133 See Strauss, supra note 131, at 962. 
134 See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Escaping the Circle By Confronting Classroom Stereotyping: 
A Step Toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of Children of Color, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & 
Pol’y Rep. 134, 135–36 (2004); Hanson, supra note 51, at 334 n.127; Dismantling the School-
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pelled and suspended at disproportionate rates nationwide.135 Even 
when controlling for actual classroom behavior, socioeconomic status, 
and gender, minority students are disproportionately excluded from 
school.136 In schools that rely heavily on suspension and expulsion as 
disciplinary tools, which are often schools with a high proportion of 
minority students, the risk that the application of these punishments 
will have a racially disparate impact increases.137 
 Once one accepts that minority students have decreased educa-
tional opportunity to begin with, the disparity in the application of zero 
tolerance policies further decreases the probability that a minority stu-
dent will obtain an education.138 The disproportionate exclusion of mi-
nority students increases the risk that “African-American families who 
have benefited from the effects of education after Brown may very well 
lose their gains in social, economic, and community development.”139 
Indeed, a student who is “expelled to nowhere” has little chance to 
benefit from whatever educational opportunities are available.140 
                                                                                                                      
to-Prison Pipeline, NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 3–4 (Oct. 10, 2005), http:// 
naacpldf.org/files/publications/Dismantling_the_School_to_Prison_Pipeline.pdf. Ameri-
can schools, especially in urban settings, are “moving toward resegregation” and African 
American and Latino students lag behind their white counterparts on academic assess-
ments. Brown, supra, at 135. Additionally, children of color learn from teachers who have 
fewer years of experience and who may teach a subject in which they do not have an aca-
demic background. Id. at 136. Children of color are also more likely to be in a larger class 
in an underfunded school, further diminishing the quality of educational opportunity. Id. 
135 Hanson, supra note 51, at 332–33. A 1992 study found that African American students 
were suspended at a rate 250% higher than the rate at which white students were suspended. 
Donald H. Stone, Crime & Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical Study of Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 17 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 351, 366 (1993). The notion that increased rates of exclusion 
among African American students are due to increased rates of poor behavior among those 
students is not supported by the facts. See Skiba et al., supra note 128, at 6. “Whether based on 
school records or student interviews, studies have failed to find racial disparities in misbehav-
ior sufficient to account for the typically wide racial differences in school punishment. If 
anything, African American students appear to receive more severe school punishments for 
less severe behavior.” Id. (citations omitted). White students are disciplined more often for 
smoking, leaving school without permission, vandalism, and obscene language. Id. at 13. 
African American students are referred to the principal’s office more often for disrespect, 
excessive noise, threats, and loitering—offenses that are both subjectively defined and less 
serious. See id. 
136 See Bell & Mariscal, supra note 25; Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 
134, at 6; Act Out, Get Out?, supra note 30, at 5; Skiba et al., supra note 128, at 15–16. 
137 See Siman, supra note 110, at 329; Skiba et al., supra note 128, at 18. 
138 See Brady, supra note 54, at 167 (stating that zero tolerance policies disproportionately 
impact students of color and special education students); Hanson, supra note 51, at 333. 
139 Hanson, supra note 51, at 333. 
140 See id. 
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 Additionally, it is more likely that African American students will 
be subject to exclusion under 37H1/2 because they are more likely to be 
targeted by police and receive harsh sentences in court.141 Moreover, 
race makes an impact at selected stages of juvenile processing because 
juvenile justice officials may be more likely to confine a youth with no 
family presence or who lacks resources to pay for community-based al-
ternatives to confinement.142 Most crucially, minorities receive more 
serious outcomes than their white counterparts.143 If minority youth are 
more likely to be stopped by police and more likely to be sentenced 
harshly, they are also more likely to fall under the umbrella of 37H1/2 
and to become a member of the uneducated underclass.144 
 The data on the application of 37H1/2 shows that, whether due to 
police action, prosecutorial decisions, or school-based biases, African 
                                                                                                                      
141 See Beale, supra note 21, at 542; Hanson, supra note 51, at 334; Reed, supra note 35, 
at 609; Skiba et al., supra note 128, at 6 (“African Americans are twice as likely to be the 
target of stop-and-frisk practices, five times more likely to be detained, and up to ten times 
as likely to be incarcerated.” (citations omitted)). Between 2002 and 2004, African Ameri-
cans were 16% of youth nationwide but 28% of juvenile arrests, 30% of referrals to juve-
nile court, 35% of youth judicially waived to criminal court, and 58% of youth admitted to 
state adult prison. And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice Sys-
tem, Nat’l Council on Crime & Delinq., 3 ( Jan. 2007), http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/ 
pubs/2007jan_justice_for_some.pdf. The same trends apply to Latino students. Neelum 
Arya et al., America's Invisible Children: Latino Youth and the Failure of Justice, Nat’l Council 
of La Raza & Campaign for Youth Just. 6 (May 20, 2009), http://www.modelsfor 
change.net/publications/213 (stating that, as compared with white youth, Latino youth 
are 4% more likely to be petitioned, 16% more likely to be adjudicated delinquent, 28% 
more likely to be detained, 41% more likely to receive an out-of-home placement, 43% 
more likely to be waived to the adult system, and 40% more likely to be admitted to adult 
prison). 
142 Carl E. Pope et al., Disproportionate Minority Confinement: A Review of the Research Lit-
erature from 1989 Through 2001, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Preven-
tion, 2, 7 (2002), http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01.pdf; see Beale, supra note 21, 
at 515. See generally Bell & Mariscal, supra note 25 (discussing the racially disparate impact 
of zero tolerance policies and the resulting overrepresentation of African American youth 
in the juvenile justice system); And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in 
the Justice System, supra note 141 (discussing racial differences throughout the juvenile jus-
tice system); Arya et al., supra note 141 (discussing the overrepresentation of Latino youth 
in the juvenile justice system). 
143 See Beale, supra note 21, at 542; Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate Minority Contact, 
Future Child., Fall 2008, at 59, 60 (“The racial differences that begin with juvenile in-
volvement in crime become larger as youth make their way through the different stages of 
the juvenile justice system—from detention, to formal hearings, to adjudications, to out-of-
home placements, and finally to waiver to adult court.”); And Justice for Some: Differential 
Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System, supra note 141, at 3; Arya et al., supra note 
141, at 6. 
144 See Beale, supra note 21, at 542; Reed, supra note 35, at 609; Skiba et al., supra note 
128, at 6. 
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American students are disproportionately excluded from schools in 
Massachusetts.145 Beginning in 2004, the Massachusetts Department of 
Education began tracking the application of 37H1/2 by race.146 The 
more recent data reiterate the disproportionate exclusion of African 
American students under 37H1/2.147 Although African American stu-
dents only made up an average of 8.39% of the student population 
statewide between 2004 and 2010, between 19% and 39% of students 
excluded under 37H1/2 were African American.148 Conversely, white stu-
dents made up an average of 71.79% of the student population and 
between 36% and 56% of students excluded under 37H1/2.149 Thus, 
white students are disproportionately underrepresented in the ex-
cluded population.150 These statistics show that minority students bear 
the brunt of the consequences under 37H1/2 and are disproportionately 
denied a minimally adequate education in the Commonwealth.151 
IV. House Bill 178: A First Step Towards Reform 
 Even if a court upheld 37H1/2 as constitutional, Massachusetts 
House Bill 178 provides an opportunity for the legislature to preserve 
principals’ abilities to keep schools safe while removing many of the 
defects of the current law.152 House Bill 178 does not address all of the 
                                                                                                                      
145 See infra Tables 1, 2. 
146 See infra Table 2. Between 1993 and 2003, African American students comprised be-
tween 8.0% and 8.8% of the students in the Massachusetts public schools but between 
18.5% and 27% of all exclusions. See infra Table 1. During the same period, the percentage 
of Hispanic students in the statewide school population grew from 8.8% to 11.2%. See id. 
Even accounting for the increase in numbers, Hispanic students disproportionately repre-
sented between 25.3% and 39.4% of exclusions statewide. See id. In comparison, white 
students comprised between 75.1% and 79.3% of the student population but represented 
only 33.1% to 48% of the exclusions. See id. 
147 See infra Table 2. 
148 See id. Hispanic students made up an average of 13.21% of the statewide population 
during the same period but an average of 18.29% of exclusions pursuant to 37H½. See id. 
School officials disproportionately excluded Hispanic students every year between 2004 
and 2010 except for 2006, when they were excluded slightly less often than statistically 
expected. See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id.; see also Skiba et al., supra note 128, at 3. 
151 See infra Table 2. 
152 See H.R. 178, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011). House Bill 177, a companion bill 
to House Bill 178, requires the commissioner to file a yearly report with the legislature 
concerning the number of, duration of, and reasons for exclusions in each school district, 
and a breakdown of excluded students “by grade level, race, gender, special education 
status, socioeconomic status, and English language proficiency,” in addition to “the alter-
native education options provided to students and the number of students re-admitted 
under the provisions of this section.” H.R. 177, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011). 
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problematic features of 37H½, but it provides a necessary first step in 
the struggle to strike an appropriate balance between school safety and 
educational opportunity for all students in the Commonwealth.153 
House Bill 178 would amend 37H½ to ensure that procedures at the 
school level were standardized between schools and districts and pre-
served students’ due process rights.154 In light of the substantial defer-
ence that courts show towards the decisions of school administrators, 
fair process and standardized procedures must exist.155 
 There are five main provisions in House Bill 178 that address the 
deficiencies of the current law.156 First, House Bill 178 imposes a one-
year cap on all exclusions and prohibits exclusions of more than ten 
days in a single school year unless the administrator determines that 
“the student’s presence in school would have a substantial detrimental 
effect on the general welfare of the school.”157 Thus, while 37H½ per-
mits all public schools to refuse admission to an excluded student, 
House Bill 178 ensures that a student’s education does not end perma-
nently after a felony exclusion.158 
 Second, House Bill 178 provides guidance to administrators in 
considering whether a student’s continued presence in school would 
have a substantial detrimental effect.159 House Bill 178 requires a de-
termination that a preponderance of the evidence supports three con-
clusions: 
 (a) that the student engaged in one or more acts of inten-
tional misconduct . . . ; 
 (b) that the student’s misconduct, because of its severity or a 
pattern of similar misconduct, indicates that if the student 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Mass. H.R. 178; see also H.R. 3435, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009) (narrow-
ing the types of felonies within the scope of the law, providing explicit guidance to admin-
istrators in the substantial detrimental effect determination, providing a ninety-day cap on 
felony exclusions, and requiring other Commonwealth schools to admit a student who has 
been excluded pursuant to 37H½ after the exclusion period has ended). 
154 See H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Peter Hahn, Co-Chair, Juvenile 
and Child Welfare Section Council of the Massachusetts Bar Association); see also id. 
(statement of Phillip Kassel, Advocacy Director, South Coastal Counties Legal Services). 
155 See id. (statement of Peter Hahn, Co-Chair, Juvenile and Child Welfare Section 
Council of the Massachusetts Bar Association). 
156 See Mass. H.R. 178. 
157 See id. The one-year cap also applies to non-felony exclusions. See id. 
158 Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008) (“Upon expulsion of such stu-
dent, no school or school district shall be required to provide educational services to such 
student.”), with Mass. H.R. 178 (“A school committee shall not exclude a student from 
public schools for any period in excess of one year . . . .”). 
159 See Mass. H.R. 178; supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
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remains in school, the student is likely to engage in fur-
ther misconduct threatening the institutional and per-
sonal security necessary for the learning and teaching en-
vironment, or that the student is likely to engage in illegal 
dealings in controlled substances and promote illegal 
drug use on school premises; and 
 (c) that there is a clear nexus between the student’s miss-
conduct and the general welfare of the school.160 
Such clarity regarding when a student’s continued presence in school 
would constitute a substantial detrimental effect prevents the danger-
ousness determination from collapsing into the felony charge or con-
viction, as it often does under the current law.161 
 Furthermore, House Bill 178 would require principals to issue 
written decisions when a student is excluded after a dangerousness de-
termination.162 The decisions would need to “demonstrate that the 
standards required . . . have been considered and evaluated” and would 
need to be in the form of “a narrative reflecting an individualized 
analysis, specific to the student, that sets out whether and how the pre-
ponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the student 
should be excluded . . . .”163 Written decisions would help ensure that a 
student is excluded only for reasons related to school safety and only 
after careful consideration and proper procedural steps.164 
 Fourth, House Bill 178 requires a hearing in advance of or shortly 
after the start of any exclusion and provides detailed requirements for a 
                                                                                                                      
160 Mass. H.R. 178. House Bill 3435, proposed in 2009, limited the scope of the law to 
reach only felonies involving violence toward a person, the use of a dangerous weapon, 
sexual assault, or trafficking in controlled substances. See H.R. 3435, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. 
(Mass. 2009). Although the three required considerations of House Bill 178 arguably ex-
clude most of the felonies excluded by House Bill 3435, House Bill 178 is not explicit. 
Compare id. (listing specific felonies that bring a student within the reach of the law), and 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1311(2) (2005) (limiting expellable offenses to weapons posses-
sion, arson, and criminal sexual conduct), with Mass. H.R. 178 (requiring a determination 
of a nexus between the misconduct and the general welfare of the school). 
161 See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Mass. 
2002). 
162 Mass. H.R. 178. 
163 Id. 
164 See id.; see also H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Dan French, Executive 
Director, Center for Collaborative Education); id. (statement of Phillip Kassel, Advocacy 
Director, South Coastal Counties Legal Services) (“The requirement that a principal go 
down a checklist and write a reasoned decision creates no burden that does not already 
exist for the conscientious disciplinarian.”). 
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fair hearing.165 House Bill 178 requires that the school conduct a hear-
ing “within ten calendar days of any pre-hearing decision to exclude a 
student.”166 If an administrator makes a written determination that 
there is substantial evidence that “the student will engage in further 
misconduct, or incite others to misconduct, which is violent or which 
threatens violence if the student is not immediately barred from school 
premises,” the administrator may exclude the student immediately.167 
In cases of immediate exclusion however, the school must hold a hear-
ing within five days of the alleged misconduct.168 Whether the hearing 
occurs within five or ten calendar days of the alleged misconduct, 
House Bill 178 requires that the school provide written notice to the 
student at least three days in advance of the hearing.169 Such notice 
must set forth the student’s procedural rights at the hearing, which in-
clude the right to bring an attorney, the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses, and the right to examine the evidence that the school relied 
upon in assessing whether the alleged conduct occurred and in making 
the dangerousness determination.170 
 Fifth, House Bill 178 requires principals to “develop a school-wide 
education service plan for all students who are excluded from school 
for more than ten consecutive school days.”171 Requiring principals to 
provide alternative education to students who are excluded for more 
                                                                                                                      
165 Compare Mass. H.R. 178 (requiring a hearing in advance or shortly after the start of 
any exclusion of ten days or more), with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H½ (2008) (requir-
ing a hearing only if the student appeals the suspension to the superintendent). Regarding 
notice and hearing requirements, one advocate stated, “While [the new definition of sub-
stantial detrimental effect] would prohibit principals from defining the term themselves, 
its clarification in law would not create an administrative burden, particularly if the term is 
reasonably applied at present.” H.R. 3435 Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Phillip Kas-
sel, Advocacy Director, South Coastal Counties Legal Services). 
166 See Mass. H.R. 178. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. House Bill 178 would guarantee that a student could be represented by a 
lawyer or advocate, could present evidence and witnesses and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, and could delay the hearing to obtain representation or to prepare. See id. House 
Bill would also guarantee that an “impartial building administrator [would] preside at the 
hearing” and that the school would provide “a description of any evidence of which the 
school is aware, including copies of any written statements and reports on which the 
school may rely, concerning whether the student committed the alleged misconduct and 
[concerning the dangerousness determination],” an interpreter, a list of free and low-cost 
legal services, audio recording equipment, and notice that statements made at the hearing 
may be used against the student in legal proceedings. See id. Section 37H½ provides no 
such protections. See § 37H½. 
171 See Mass. H.R. 178. 
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than ten days will prevent any student from being “expelled to no-
where” and will ensure that the student’s education continues during 
the period of exclusion.172 
 Although House Bill 178 represents a significant improvement 
upon current practices, further changes are necessary in order to en-
sure that 37H½ only applies to students whose presence poses a serious 
threat to the school community.173 First, even if principals consider the 
required elements before making a dangerousness determination, there 
is no guarantee that a student who has committed a non-violent felony 
will not be excluded.174 Section 37H½ would better protect students’ 
ability to stay in school if it limited the types of felonies that triggered 
potential exclusion.175 In addition, principals should be required to con-
sider alternatives to exclusion before removing a student from school 
after a felony charge or conviction.176 Especially if all felonies trigger 
potential action under 37H½, principals should be required to engage 
                                                                                                                      
172 See id. Although alternative education programs present another set of risks that a 
student will not receive a minimally adequate education, some education is preferable to 
no education at all. See generally Barbour, supra note 64 (arguing that alternative education 
programs infringe upon the right to a minimally adequate education). 
173 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1311(2) (2005) (limiting expellable offenses to 
weapons possession, arson, and criminal sexual conduct); H.R. 3435, 2009 Leg., 186th 
Sess. (Mass. 2009) (limiting expellable offenses to violence towards a person, use of a dan-
gerous weapon, sexual assault, or trafficking in controlled substances and requiring con-
sideration of non-exclusionary alternatives); supra note 160. 
174 Compare Mass. H.R. 178 (applying to all felonies), with Mass. H.R. 3435 (limiting 
expellable offenses); supra note 160. 
175 See Mass. H.R. 3435 (limiting expellable offenses); see also § 380.1311(2) (limiting 
expellable offenses); supra note 160. 
176 See Mass. H.R. 3435. House Bill 3435 would have required principals to consider 
several factors in advance of exclusion, including whether the incident occurred in or near 
school; whether the conduct was defensive; whether similar conduct is likely in the future; 
and whether transfer—as opposed to exclusion—would lessen the threat posed by the 
student’s presence in school. Id. Other factors include “whether no[n]-exclusionary alter-
natives to suspension and expulsion are appropriate”; “whether other students from the 
school were involved”; “whether the conduct was egregious and involved violence or 
threats of violence causing or capable of causing serious bodily harm”; “the student’s rela-
tive culpability given his or her chronological and developmental age and ability to under-
stand the consequences of the misconduct”; “whether the student has been identified or 
been referred for evaluation for special needs”; “whether it was the student’s intention to 
cause or create fear of serious bodily harm”; whether the incident involved a weapon and 
more than two students or the use of a dangerous weapon; and, if drugs were involved, the 
“relative seriousness of the controlled substance involved and the quantity found in the 
student’s possession.” Id. Many of these considerations have more to do with exclusions 
pursuant to section 37H (which addresses weapon and drug exclusions, not felony exclu-
sions), but the list of factors is instructive because it requires nuanced consideration of the 
circumstances instead of a mechanical determination to exclude a student. See id. 
374 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:343 
in a nuanced consideration of the alleged conduct, the student’s past 
behavior in school, and the actual risks to the school community.177 
 In addition to legislative reform, schools and teachers across the 
state can take other steps to decrease the long-term consequences for 
students who come within the reach of 37H1/2.178 Educators should 
lessen reliance on zero tolerance policies such as 37H1/2 and increase 
reliance on in-school counseling, parent communication, mediation, 
and behavioral modification techniques.179 Not only would this decrease 
the number of students who misbehave during the school day, but it 
would also have a positive effect on students’ out-of-school behavior and 
consequently, on the number of students who commit felonies.180 
 Furthermore, lawmakers and school officials need to remember 
that children are different from adults—physically, mentally, socially, 
and emotionally.181 After a felony charge or conviction, a juvenile must 
be able to learn from his or her mistakes and decide to become a pro-
ductive member of society.182 Education is a prerequisite to exercising 
other constitutional rights, to gaining employment, to service in the 
military, and to other basic functions of citizenship.183 The fundamen-
tal importance of education in the life of every American dictates that, 
before taking it away, the government must meet a higher burden than 
37H1/2 currently requires.184 
Conclusion 
 Section 37H1/2 was passed in a panic about school safety but has 
had hidden consequences since its inception, depriving far too many 
students of their right to a minimally adequate education. The dispro-
portionate effect on minority students and the lack of alternative edu-
cation in many cities and towns raises further questions about the law’s 
wisdom. In addition, citizens without a basic education are not pre-
                                                                                                                      
177 See id. (requiring consideration of several non-exclusionary alternatives). Although 
factors (a) through (c) in House Bill 178, required as part of the dangerousness determi-
nation, address these concerns somewhat, they do not do so explicitly. See Mass. H.R. 178; 
supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
178 See Wald, supra note 33. 
179 See id.; Act Out, Get Out?, supra note 30, at 21. 
180 See Wald, supra note 33. 
181 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–75 (2005) (noting juveniles’ lack of matur-
ity, their susceptibility to outside influences and peer pressure, and their still-developing 
character). 
182 See DeMarco, supra note 21, at 571. 
183 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
184 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
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pared to fully exercise other constitutional rights, are unqualified for 
most careers, and cannot join the military or go to college. Pursuant to 
37H1/2, over 1600 Massachusetts students have begun their journey into 
the uneducated underclass, a journey that may begin with something as 
foolish as stealing a bag of chips. 
 Though 37H1/2 is either unknown or popular in Massachusetts, the 
law has had severe consequences for communities. The excluded stu-
dents of today are the repeat offenders of tomorrow and will crowd the 
Commonwealth’s prisons for many years to come. Despite the fact that 
educating a child for one year costs less than imprisoning that same 
child for one year, communities are excluding students at alarming 
rates without regard to the long-term consequences. 
 Section 37H1/2 must be amended. The law must protect schools’ 
ability to keep students safe, but it must also reflect the reality that chil-
dren make mistakes and should not lose the opportunity to obtain a 
minimally adequate education after “one act of childish miscon-
duct.”185 House Bill 178 provides the legislature with the opportunity to 
clarify the procedures that educators must follow in order to exclude a 
student and to ensure that exclusions balance the need for safe schools 
with students’ interests in continued education. 
                                                                                                                      
185 See Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track, supra note 21, at 7. 
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Table 1: 1993–2003 Statistics* 
School 
Year 
Total Student 
Population by Race 
(%) 
AA/H/W 
All Exclusions 
by Race 
(%) 
AA/H/W 
37H1/2 
Exclusions (#) 
General education 
students receiving 
alternative education 
(%) 
93–94 8.1/8.8/79.3 25.2/25.3/48.0 12 49.8 
94–95 8.0/9.0/79.1 21.3/34.0/42.9 65 58.2 
95–96 8.2/9.3/78.5 22.7/39.4/33.1 62 57.6 
96–97 8.4/9.6/77.9 23.4/33.8/39.7 63 54.9 
97–98 8.5/9.7/77.5 18.5/34.8/41.4 130 58.3 
98–99 8.6/10.0/77.1 19.0/32.0/45.0 93 56.0 
99–00 8.6/10.2/76.6 24.0/33.0/39.0 102 61.0 
00–01 8.7/10.7/75.9 27.0/30.0/40.0 102 64.0 
01–02 8.6/10.8/75.7 23.5/28.2/45.6 155 63.0 
02–03 8.8/11.2/75.1 26.9/31.3/38.2 98 68.0 
* The Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) keeps 
statistics on the racial makeup of the student population in Massachusetts public schools. See 
Student Data, Mass. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ., http://profiles. 
doe.mass.edu (follow “State Profile” hyperlink; then follow “Students” tab; then use arrows to 
navigate from year to year) (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). The data in the column labeled “All 
Exclusions by Race” was computed by dividing the number of African American (AA), 
Hispanic (H), or white (W) students expelled each year by the total number of expulsions 
each year. See Student Exclusions, Mass. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 
http:// www.doe.mass.edu/infoservices/reports/exclusions (follow hyperlinks for each year’s 
report) (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). The data on the number of exclusions pursuant to 37H½ 
and the number of general education students receiving alternative education is contained in 
the DESE’s yearly reports as well. See id. All data about Asian and Native American students has 
been omitted from these calculations. 
 
Table 2: 2004–2010 Statistics* 
School 
Year 
Total Student 
Population by Race 
(%) 
AA/H/W 
37H1/2 Exclusions 
by Race 
(%) 
AA/H/W 
37H1/2 
Exclusions (#) 
03–04 8.8/11.5/74.6 23/27/36 180 
04–05 8.9/11.8/74.2 39/17/40 109 
05–06 8.3/12.9/72.4 26/12/55 147 
06–07 8.2/13.3/71.5 19/23/50 145 
07–08 8.1/13.9/70.8 38/15/44 131 
08–09 8.2/14.3/69.9 30/17/41 93 
09–10 8.2/14.8/69.1 23/17/56 104 
* See E-mail from Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ. (DESE) Admin., to author 
(Jan. 10, 2011, 14:07 EST) (on file with author) (providing a link to the 2004–2010 statistics 
that was live for seven days, in response to an e-mail sent to data@doe.mass.edu); 2010 E-mail 
from DESE Admin., supra note 61; Student Data, Mass. Department of Elementary & 
Secondary Educ., http://profiles.doe.mass.edu (follow “State Profile” hyperlink; then follow 
“Students” tab; then use arrows to navigate from year to year) (last visited May 8, 2011). All 
data about Asian and Native American students has been omitted from these calculations. 
 
